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Abstract
Using a unique dataset for Germany that links individual longitudinal data from 
the GSOEP to regional data from the federal employment agency and data of real 
estate prices, we evaluate the impact of neighborhood unemployment on individual 
employment propects. The panel setup and richness of the data allows us to overcome 
some of the identiﬁ  cation problems which are present in this strand of literature. The 
empirical results indicate that there is a signiﬁ  cant negative impact of neighborhood 
unemployment on the individual employment probability.
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Agents belonging to the same group tend to behave similarly and to display
similar outcomes. A prominent example is the observation that growing up in
a higher (socio-)economic status neighborhood and attending a school with
(socio-)economically advantaged classmates is often associated with better
academic, social, and labor market outcomes. These stylized facts are com-
plemented by the observation of increasing income inequality, a decline in the
earnings and employment opportunities of those at the bottom of the income
distribution as well as an increase in the regional concentration of poverty
and racial segregation. From a policy point of view, residential segregation
and its potential impact on the socioeconomic performance and outcomes of
individuals (as well as their children) is a highly relevant topic. Inner cities
in the US, suburbs of Paris and deprived areas of large German cities like
Berlin, are regularly a cause for concern.
In the economic literature, these observations have drawn pronounced
attention to models of social interactions (Manski, 2000). Such models refer
to direct interactions between individuals that are not mediated by mar-
ket mechanisms and which lead to similarities in the behavior of individuals
belonging to a given reference group.1 Social interaction models display a va-
riety of interesting features and implications. The interdependence between
group behavior and individual behavior may, for instance, lead to multiple
equilibria which are all consistent with individual rationality and can include
so-called low-level equilibria or ”traps”. This means, for instance, that in
such models a culture of poverty can emerge from which it is hard to es-
cape. Moreover, social interactions may have important repercussions on
the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of policy interventions, since speciﬁc interac-
tion eﬀects are able to create ”social multipliers”, i.e. policy interventions
can have a positive spill-over eﬀect on non-treated individuals, if they aﬀect
their behavior via certain social interactions with treated individuals (see
1Models explaining such phenomena carry diﬀerent names among which social interactions,
social learning, social capital, neighborhood eﬀects, preference interdependence, herd
behavior, social networks, peer eﬀects and social norms are the most prominent.
4Manski, 1993b; Moﬃtt, 2001; Durlauf, 2004). However, the extent to which
the association between individual behavior and/or outcome and the behav-
ior and/or outcome of a given reference group reﬂects a causal relationship
is still debated heavily.
Against this scientiﬁc and policy background, this paper investigates the
relationship between neighborhoods and individual labor market outcomes.
The central questions we address are: Does living in a disadvantageous neigh-
borhood exhibit a detrimental causal impact on the behavior and labor mar-
ket outcomes of an individual? Or is living in a speciﬁc neighborhood the
manifestation of a sorting mechanism that is aﬀected by an unobservable
factor which also determines labor market outcomes? In particular, we in-
vestigate whether the unemployment rate in a neighborhood has a causal
impact on the unemployment probability of individuals living in this neigh-
borhood.
To answer these research questions, we employ a unique dataset that links
rich longitudinal individual data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) to administrative and regionally aggregated data from the federal
unemployment agency as well as house prices obtained from the biggest Ger-
man internet platform for real estates. To indentify the causal eﬀect of the
neighborhood unemployment rate on the individual unemployment probabil-
ity, we follow a strategy developed by Bayer and Ross (2006), which combines
instrumental variable estimators with a control function approach. Our em-
pirical results show that the individual employment probability is negatively
aﬀected by the neighborhood unemployment rate, i.e., that an increase in
the local unemployment rate by 1 percentage point increases the individ-
ual unemployment probability on average by about 1.6%. Hence, our results
indicate that social interactions are indeed able to create ”social multipliers”.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we provide a brief liter-
ature review on neighborhood eﬀects, concentrating on studies investigating
the eﬀects of neighborhoods on individual employment outcomes. Section
53 describes our data and discusses our empirical strategy. The estimation
results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 summarizes our results
and draws some policy conclusions.
2 Literature Review
The existing theoretical literature suggest several channels through which
the neighborhood may aﬀect individual employment status: (i) sorting, (ii)
interdependencies in the constraints faced by individuals in the same neigh-
borhood, and (iii) social networks.2 With respect to sorting, neighborhood
eﬀects on unemployment may occur just because individuals with similar
characteristics may prefer to live in the same neighborhood. Papers that
stress the role of interdependencies in individuals’ constraints usually ar-
gue that a higher aggregate unemployment lowers the psychological costs
of unemployment by making this status more of the norm and hence low-
ers individual search intensity (see, among others, Besley and Coate, 1992;
Clark, 2003; Kassenb¨ ohmer and Haisken-DeNew, 2009; Lindbeck et al., 1999;
Pissarides, 2000). Finally, neighborhoods may aﬀect individual employment
status through social networks, which transfer information about job vacan-
cies faster and in a more eﬃcient way and may lead to more job referrals
(see, among others, Montgomery, 1990; Finneran and Kelly, 2003; Krauth,
2004).
Empirical studies of neighborhood eﬀects are subject to severe identiﬁca-
tion problems (see Manski, 1989, 1993a,b, 1995, 2000). For the identiﬁcation
of neighborhood eﬀects, one has to distinguish between endogenous interac-
tions, exogenous or contextual interactions, and correlated eﬀects (Manski,
1993b, 2000). Endogenous interactions in the sense of Manski refer to the
propensity that an individuals behavior varies with the behavior of the re-
spective reference group, while exogenous or contextual interactions refer
2A comprehensive overview of the neighborhood eﬀects literature is given by Durlauf
(2004).
6to the possibility that the behavior of individuals is aﬀected by the exoge-
nous characteristics of the reference group. Correlated eﬀects subsume the
possibility that the behavior of diﬀerent individuals belonging to the same
reference group is similar just because they have the same characteristics
or face the same institutional settings. Typically, disentangling these three
diﬀerent eﬀects is not possible without strong identiﬁcation assumptions. To
discriminate between these three eﬀects is, however, essential because only
endogenous interactions are able to create spill-over or feedback eﬀects of pol-
icy interventions between treated and non-treated individuals, while contex-
tual interactions and correlated eﬀects do not display such a social multiplier.
Manski (1993b) shows that inference on these diﬀerent social interaction
eﬀects is not possible as long as the researcher has no prior information on
the composition of the reference group of an individual. In most empirical
studies the reference group is typically assumed without providing further
evidence for this choice (one noticeable exception is Woittiez and Kapteyn,
1998). But even if this information were available, identiﬁcation of speciﬁc
social eﬀects critically depends on a set of identiﬁcation assumptions. The
main obstacle to identifying diﬀerent forms of social interactions, which is
– following Manski – referred to as the reﬂection problem, is the fact that
the average behavior of the reference group itself is inﬂuenced by individual
behavior. It is a priori not clear from observing the value of a speciﬁc out-
come measure, whether group behavior impinges upon individual behavior
or if the behavior of the group is simply the aggregation of all individual
behaviors. Therefore, it is very diﬃcult to separately identify endogenous
and contextual eﬀects. Because of this problem, existing empirical studies
either just aim to estimate one of the two eﬀects assuming the absence of the
other or the aggregate of both eﬀects.
In addition to the reﬂection problem, it is necessary to disentangle en-
dogenous and contextual eﬀects from correlated eﬀects. The later could be
considered as a self-selection problem resulting from the possibility that in-
dividuals choose to live in the neighborhood of persons with the same char-
7acteristics, some of which may be unobserved to the econometrician (see,
e.g. Evans et al., 1992; Rivkin, 2001) or that individuals could value certain
unobservable amenities in a neighborhood. In consequence, the conclusions
reached by diﬀerent empirical studies addressing the existence and extent of
such neighborhood eﬀects often depend upon the speciﬁc identiﬁcation strat-
egy used to account for the potential endogeneity of neighborhood choice.
The identiﬁcation of endogenous social interactions and, therefore, their
distinction from contextual interactions and correlated eﬀects is the most
challenging issue in this research area. It is typically conceived that such
eﬀects are most credibly identiﬁed by a social experiment, i.e. a randomly
assigned social program which operates at diﬀerent intensities within and
between peer groups (see, among others, Duﬂo and Saez, 2002; Kling et al.,
2001; Sacerdote, 2006; Zimmerman, 2003). Randomization secures identiﬁca-
tion by balancing the treatment and control group in all relevant characteris-
tics, observable as well as unobservable. The majority of empirical research,
however, comprises observational studies facing the potential problem of en-
dogeneity of reference group choice. Often, this problem is addressed either
by an instrumental variable or by a control function approach. Some studies
also restrict their sample to individuals for which one can assume that they
did not choose their neighborhood, such as, for example, youths still living
with their parents (Dujardin et al., 2009)
Overall, the existing empirical evidence suggests that a deprived neigh-
borhood indeed reduces individual employment prospects. Studies utilizing
data from controlled and natural experiments mostly ﬁnd signiﬁcant neigh-
borhood eﬀects. The Gautreux Experiment, which started in Chicago in
1976, assigned low-income African-Americans randomly to middle-income
white suburbs and low-income urban areas by a quasi-random assignment of
destinations via housing vouchers. The empirical results suggest that subur-
ban movers show higher employment probabilities, higher youth educational
and better social integration outcomes (Rosenbaum, 1995). The Gautreux
Program was the blueprint for the Moving-to-Opportunity Program (MTO),
8which was conducted in ﬁve US cities. Evidence from the MTO random-
ized experiments in Boston and Baltimore indicate the presence of signif-
icant neighborhood eﬀects: various outcome measures (employment, earn-
ings, criminal activity) exhibit improvements of up to 50% compared to the
control group of individuals staying in deprived regions (see, among others,
Kling et al., 2001; Ludwig et al., 2001; Rosenbaum and Harris, 2001; Ore-
opoulos, 2003). However, controlled experiments suﬀer from the problem
that their external validity is questionable. Hence, the extent to which their
results can be extrapolated to the population not under study is an unre-
solved issue.
Empirical studies using observational data also predominantly conclude,
that neighborhoods matter for individual labor market outcomes. These
studies use a variety of diﬀerent empirical strategies to identify neighbor-
hood eﬀects, including, for example, a combination of ﬁxed-eﬀects to con-
trol for correlated eﬀects and an instrumental variable or control function
approach to deal with selection eﬀects (see, among others, Bayer and Ross,
2006; Bayer et al., 2008; Bertrand et al., 2000; Case and Katz, 1991; Dujardin
and Goﬀette-Nagot, 2006, 2010; Weinberg et al., 2004). Brock and Durlauf
(2001a,b) show that Manski’s reﬂection problem may be solved in non-linear
regression models. Empirical studies that are based on non-linear models
rather than linear-in-means models also point towards signiﬁcant neighbor-
hood eﬀects. As a prominent example, van der Klaauw and van Ours (2003)
investigate the inﬂuence of the neighborhood on the transition rates from wel-
fare to work in Rotterdam. They estimate Mixed Proportional Hazard Rate
models controlling for a variety of neighborhood characteristics, such as the
local unemployment rate and average house prices, as well as neighborhood
ﬁxed eﬀects. They ﬁnd a negative relationship between the neighborhood
unemployment rate and the transition rate from welfare to work for young
Dutch, but not for older and non-Dutch welfare recipients. This result con-
ﬁrms similar empirical studies of neighborhood eﬀects for the US (Hoynes,
2000) and Sweden (Hedstr¨ om et al., 2003).
93 Identiﬁcation Strategy and Data
The following basic empirical model, which resembles the standard linear-in-
means model of neighborhood peer eﬀects (Manski, 1993a; Case and Katz,
1991), is our starting point to evaluate the eﬀect of neighborhood unemploy-
ment on individual unemployment:
Yijt = α + βXijt + γNjt + εijt
= α + βXijt + θ¯ Ujt + ηZjt + ψi + τj + δt + uijt, (1)
where Yijt is a discrete variable taking the value 1 if an individual i, living
in the neighborhood j is unemployed at time t, and 0 otherwise. We assume
that the relevant neighborhood for an individual is deﬁned by the postal
area, as these areas are smaller than most existing oﬃcial boundaries and
often bounded by distinct landmarks, e.g. major roads encircling an area or
certain parts of a town. Furthermore postcodes are visible to the individual
as well as to the outside world, thus allowing for the presence of stigma or
status eﬀects. Additionally, they are still small enough to allow their use
as a neighborhood. Xijt is a vector of observable individual characteristics,
including a squared function of age, indicator variables for marriage status,
foreigner status, and gender, as well as two dummy variables for the educa-
tional degree of the individual. Njt = ¯ Ujt + Zjt captures observable average
neighborhood characteristics consisting of the average unemployment rate in
the neighborhood ¯ Ujt and other observable neighborhood characteristics Zjt.
The error term εijt = ψi + τj + δt + uijt is assumed to capture unobserved
individual characteristics ψi, unobserved neighborhood characteristics τj, un-
observed shocks to the neighborhood δt and an idiosyncratic error uijt.
The main coeﬃcient of interest is θ, which – following Manskis’ terminol-
ogy – captures the endogenous eﬀect of unemployment in the neighborhood
on the individual unemployment propensity. Even though we control for a
number of personal and neighborhood characteristics, this parameter may
10still be biased, since it is likely to capture a mixture of endogenous, corre-
lated and contextual eﬀects (Manski, 1993b, 1995). We aim to control for
contextual eﬀects by including a set of neighborhood control variables in the
vector ¯ Zjt, i.e. the share of foreigners, the number of individuals living in the
area and average education proxied by the share of higher educated work-
ers living in the area. Correlated eﬀects, that is exogenous shocks which
happen to aﬀect all individuals belonging to a peer group (in this case also
living in the same neighborhood), are most likely controlled for by includ-
ing time ﬁxed eﬀects (δt) in the model (Bertrand et al., 2000; Fletcher, 2010).
Even though our data allows us to control for a number of individual
and neighborhood characteristics, our estimates may still be biased because
unobserved individual and neighborhood characteristics may be correlated
with the neighborhood characteristics Njt, i.e. because cov (Njt,ψ i)  = 0 and
cov (Njt,τ j)  = 0. The former may happen because individuals sort them-
selves non-randomly over neighborhoods and thereby generate a correlation
between the unemployment rate in the neighborhood and unobservable indi-
vidual characteristics. For example, ambition may drive the sorting process
into diﬀerent neighborhoods. Second, unobserved neighborhood characteris-
tics, such as, e.g. an ineﬃcient employment agency, may be correlated with
the observed mean unemployment rate in the neighborhood. To eliminate
the bias arising from these correlations, we follow a two step procedure that
follows the identiﬁcation strategy outlined by Bayer and Ross (2006). To
control for the correlation between individual unobservables and neighbor-
hood characteristics we rely on an instrumental variable approach (IV). The
potential bias of θ that may arise through the correlation between unobserved
and observed neighborhood characteristics is addressed by a control function
approach.3
The IV method to control for individuals sorting on unobservable charac-
3Using a control function approach to address a potential bias due to unobserved neigh-
borhood characteristics has also been suggested by Ioannides and Zabel (2008) and Brock
and Durlauf (2007).
11teristics is implemented as a cell-based approach. We take all permutations of
observable individual characteristics, i.e. age (aggregated to ﬁve-year brack-
ets), gender, marital status, nationality and three education level categories,
to generate cells of observably identical individuals. The cell means of the
neighborhood characteristics over these observably identical individuals are
then used as instruments for the neighborhood characteristics captured by
the vector Njt in equation (1).4 Hence, we eliminate the portion of variation
in neighborhood characteristics which is due to sorting on individual unob-
servables and use only the portion of variation that is explained by observable
individual characteristics. This implies, that we expect observationally iden-
tical individuals as being exposed to similar neighborhood characteristics.
Note that this IV approach is equivalent to a fully speciﬁed non-parametric
sorting model (Bayer and Ross, 2006). The non-linearity of this approach
should further facilitate the identiﬁcation of peer eﬀects (Brock and Durlauf,
2001a,b; Durlauf, 2001).
The second part of our identiﬁcation strategy involves obtaining a mea-
sure for unobservable neighborhood characteristics τj using a control func-
tion approach. Again, we follow Bayer and Ross (2006) and take the average
regional residual from a hedonic house price regression, which includes neigh-
borhood characteristics as well as controls for the particular dwelling:
log(Pkjt)=ξ + φHkjt + ζNkjt + ωkjt, (2)
where Pkjt is the price of house k in the postal area j at time t. Hkjt are
house characteristics (size, number of rooms, a cubic function of the age of
the dwelling, type of dwelling and dummies controlling for the quality of the
dwelling), and Nkjt are the regional characteristics described above.5 We use
the average residual ¯ ωjt calculated over each postal area from equation (2) as
an additional control variable in equation (1). The residual from equation (2)
4The cell-means are calculated without the individual contribution to the mean. As a
robustness check we excluded cells with fewer than ﬁve observations. The results reported
below, however, are insensitive towards this exclusion.
5The results from estimating equation (2) are reported in Appendix-Table 6.
12should capture all factors inﬂuencing the house price besides the observable
characteristics of the individual building and neighborhood. Hence, ¯ ωjt can
be interpreted as a factor controlling for unobservable regional amenities, for
which individuals are inclined to pay more. This is a reasonable control func-
tion approach, as long as individuals sort into neighborhoods with regard to
income and housing quality and/or amenities.6
Figure 1: Residual from Hedonic House Price Regression
The regional distribution of residuals from the hedonic house price re-
gression, i.e. ¯ ωjt, is shown in Figure (1), with darker dots indicating postal
areas in which individuals are willing to pay more to live than the amount
6We also estimated equation (2) using an instrumental strategy similar to the one used
above in the individual unemployment regression model, where we instrument the neig-
borhood characteristics with cell means based on all permutations of observable house
price characteristics. This ensures, that the typical characteristics of houses, i.e. overall
housing quality, in a neighborhood is not aﬀected by observed neighborhood character-
istics, which would lead to reverse causation problem. Both approaches, however, yield
similar results. Hence, we report only those results obtained by estimating equation (2)
by OLS. The estimation results from the IV approach are available from the authors upon
request.
13attributable to observed housing and neighborhood characteristics. The ﬁg-
ure shows that the most expensive areas are around Munich in the South,
Frankfurt, the area around Cologne, Hamburg, and Berlin, while ¯ ωjt is rela-
tively low in the rural areas of Germany.
A ﬁnal problem emerges, as ¯ ωjt may well be correlated with ψi because
individuals could have unobservably diﬀerent preferences for these neighbor-
hood amenities. We overcome this problem by using an instrumentation
strategy as before, with the the cell means of ¯ ωjt for observationally identical
individuals as instruments.
Hence, the most elaborated model we estimate is
yijt = α + βXijt + γ ˆ Zjt + θˆ ¯ Ujt + ˆ ¯ ωjt + εijt, (3)
with Zjt, Ujt and ¯ ω as instrumented variables. Neighborhood characteristics
and the control for unobservable neighborhood characteristics in this speciﬁ-
cation are purged of any inﬂuence from sorting behavior (i.e. the sorting on
unobservables), giving us an unbiased estimator of the eﬀect of neighborhood
unemployment on the individual unemployment probability θ.
The data used to estimate equation (3) is a unique dataset comprised of
three parts: longitudinal individual data from the German Socioeconomic
Panel (SOEP)7, information on house prices and house characteristics ob-
tained from an online real estate agency platform, and administrative labor
force data provided by the Research Data Centre of the Federal Employ-
ment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research. The latter is taken
from the oﬃcial employment and unemployment registers8 and provides in-
formation on the employment status, the nationality, age, and gender for
7The data extraction from the SOEP was done using PanelWhiz (Haisken-DeNew and
Hahn, 2010)
8This data is part of the SOEP Neighborhood Project at the RWI. The authors want
to thank Stefan Bender and J¨ org Heining from the Research Data Centre at the Federal
Employment Agency for their invaluable eﬀort and support and the Leibniz-Gemeinschaft
for ﬁnancial support.
14all persons oﬃcially registered as unemployed or employed and liable to the
social security system.9 Note that the this administrative data provides in-
formation on the education level only for employed persons. Hence, the the
corresponding shares used in the empirical analysis refers to the educational
status of the workforce. The individual level data from the GSOEP con-
tains individual information on age, education, marital status, gender and
nationality. The data on house prices was obtained from Immobilienscout 24,
which is the largest German online platform for selling and renting houses
and ﬂats. This dataset contains all recorded oﬀers from the years 2003 to
2004 and includes information on house characteristics as well as the oﬀering
price and can be merged to the other data sources on the postcode level.
Using the employment registers, we calculate the size of the workforce
as the sum of employed persons who are subject to social insurance contri-
butions and registered unemployed persons. We also include the share of
workers with higher education (i.e. with a university degree or a degree from
a university of applied science), the share of foreigners in the workforce as
well as the share of unemployed at the postcode level for the period from
2003 to 2004. Due to data quality issues we are not able to extend our anal-
ysis past 2004. In 2005 the new unemployment beneﬁt system in Germany
(commmonly known as “Hartz IV-reform”) was implemented. This reform
resulted in severe data problems in the following years, as unemployment
data was not properly exchanged between local and federal unemployment
agencies. This generated data from the employment statistics has then been
merged to the SOEP on the level of 3,032 distinct postcode areas. The fol-
lowing empirical analysis is further restricted to all individuals aged between
17 and 65 not in full time education, resulting in an unbalanced panel of
21,237 person-year observations of 12,932 individuals for the years 2003 and
2004.
9Not covered are therefore unemployed persons who are not registered as unemployed,
employed persons in minor employment or in employment outside the general social
security system, mainly self-employed and government workers.
15Table 1 provides unweighted descriptive statistics of the variables used in
the empirical analysis. It appears that the average individual unemployment
probability is 9.8%, while the average unemployment share in the neighbor-
hood is about 12%. Several factors may be responsible for this diﬀerence.
First, the SOEP is neither representative for the German population nor
for those who have paid social security contributions, the latter being the
population of the employment registers. Second, the data from the SOEP
is usually collected in the ﬁrst three months of a year, while the unemploy-
ment rate from the employment registers have been calculated using end-of-
the-year notiﬁcations and third, the individual unemployment information is
self-reported and not necessarily identical to the oﬃcial unemployment deﬁni-
tion. For similar reasons the local share of long-term unemployment, deﬁned
as the number of unemployed with an unemployment spell longer than one
year, of 2.8% diﬀers from the individual probability of being unemployed for
more than a year. Also the share of foreigners in the SOEP diﬀers from the
respective share obtained from the employment registers. While about 14%
of the individuals in our sample are foreigners, the average share of foreigners
in the neighborhood is 7.3%. Again the non-representativeness of the SOEP
is responsible for the this divergence, since the SOEP oversamples foreigners.
Another reason, why the numbers diverge between both datasets is the rela-
tively high proportion of foreigners in self-employment (Sachverst¨ andigenrat
deutscher Stiftungen f¨ ur Integration und Migration, 2010).
We use the ISCED classiﬁcation to control for an individuals’ level of ed-
ucation. The lowest ISCED levels 1-2 (and below) comprise basic schooling
and lower secondary schooling. Henceforth, we refer to this group as low-
educated. ISCED 3-4 refers to medium educated individuals, i.e. persons
with upper secondary schooling and any post-secondary schooling as well as
vocational training in combination with basic schooling. ISCED 5-6 refers
to tertiary education and higher education in general. The share of lower
educated persons in our sample is about 18%, medium educated individuals
make up 59% and the highest educated group comprises about 23%. In our
16Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
2003 2004 Overall
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Individual Variables
Age 41.131 11.837 42.109 11.899 41.652 11.880
(within-variation) (12.201)
(between-variation) (0.442)
Age2 (1,000) 1.832 0.974 1.915 0.989 1.876 0.983
(1.007)
(0.038)
Married 0.019 0.137 0.017 0.13 0.018 0.133
(0.126)
(0.072)
Foreigner 0.142 0.349 0.131 0.338 0.136 0.343
(0.338)
(-)
Female 0.471 0.499 0.472 0.499 0.472 0.499
(0.499)
(-)
Low Education (ISCED 1-2) 0.174 0.379 0.156 0.362 0.164 0.370
(0.370)
(0.041)
Medium Education (ISCED 3-4) 0.615 0.487 0.59 0.492 0.602 0.490
(0.490)
(0.045)
High Education (ISCED 5-6) 0.211 0.408 0.254 0.436 0.234 0.424
(0.430)
(0.019)




Local Unemployment Rate (%) 12.331 6.12 11.941 5.738 11.301 5.501
(5.537)
(0.402)
Local Long-Term Unemployment Rate (%) 2.887 1.524 2.552 1.508 2.745 1.517
(1.115)
(0.686)
Population (1,000) 7.857 4.437 7.874 4.414 6.944 3.971
(3.930)
(0.080)
Share of Highly Educated (%) 7.812 4.921 7.959 5.184 7.992 5.466
(5.609)
(0.507)
Share of Foreigners (%) 7.272 7.659 7.338 7.717 7.723 7.826
(7.870)
(0.428)
Note: Number of Observations: 9,920 (2003); 11,317 (2004)
17empirical analysis, we use the lowest skilled group as the control group.
On average 7,900 individuals are living in a typical postal code area. The
smallest neighborhood has a population of about 2,500 persons, the largest
of almost 25,500. The share of workers with a tertiary schooling degree in a
neighborhood is on average 7.9% varying from 0% to more than 40%. Also
the share of foreigners in a neighborhood shows a high variation. On average
this share is 7.3% varying from 0% to almost 49%. The same holds for the
share of unemployed, which varies between 3.1% and 38.9%.
4 Results
Table 2 shows the basic results from estimating equation (3) by OLS to pro-
vide a documentation of the multivariate correlatione between the individual
unemployment probability and the local unemployment rate. In column (1)
we only control for individual characteristics in addition to the regional un-
employment rate and a time ﬁxed eﬀect, adding neighborhood controls to the
speciﬁcation in column (2) and our measure for the unobservable neighbor-
hood quality obtained from the estimated hedonic house price equation (2)
in column (3). The estimated correlation of the unemployment rate in the
neighborhood on the individual unemployment probability is positive and
highly signiﬁcant in all three speciﬁcations. However, even if one would be
able to interpret these coeﬃcients as a causal relationship, they would not
necessarily hint towards the existence of neighborhood eﬀects. Assume that
the average individual unemployment probability is the same as the mean
local unemployment rate. Then a shock that increases the individual un-
employment probability should increase the local unemployment rate by the
same amount, i.e. the coeﬃcient of the local unemployment rate is expected
to be 0.01. Due to the reasons discussed above, the average individual un-
employment rate is not equal to the local unemployment rate in our sample.
Therefore, in the absence of neighborhood eﬀects we would expect a coeﬃ-
cient of 0.0081 (= 0.098 /12.1) for the local unemployment rate. Since the
18estimated coeﬃcients on the unemployment rate in the neighborhood are
signiﬁcantly larger than 0.0081, the results shown in Table 2 indeed suggest
that neighborhoods might matter.
The estimated coeﬃcients for the individual control variables are as ex-
pected. We ﬁnd an U-shaped eﬀect of age, a higher unemployment probabil-
ity for foreigners and a pronounced lower unemployment probability for high
skilled individuals. The neighborhood controls for the population size in the
postcode area, the share of foreigners and the share of high skilled workers are
insigniﬁcant and close to zero in magnitude. The coeﬃcient of our neighbor-
hood quality control variable ¯ ωjt is negative, but insigniﬁcant. Note further,
that neither the inclusion of observable neighborhood characteristics nor the
inclusion of ¯ ωjt has a signiﬁcant impact on the estimated eﬀect of the local
unemployment rate on the individual unemployment probability, indicating
that in our case contextual eﬀects do not bias the estimated eﬀect of interest.
The OLS estimates of neighborhood eﬀects shown in Table 2 may still be
biased due to the sorting behavior of individuals with respect to neighborhood
characteristics and unobservable neighborhood quality. We therefore turn our
focus to the estimated eﬀects of the local unemployment rate on the individ-
ual unemployment probability obtained from our IV regressions, which are
summarized in Table 3.10 Column (1) of Table 3 refers to the most simple
IV speciﬁcation where neighborhood unemployment and all other neighbor-
hood controls are instrumented by the cell means of observationally identical
individuals. Column (2) adds our control variable for neighborhood qual-
ity, and in column (3) the latter is also instrumented in the same way as
all other neighborhood characteristics. The estimated coeﬃcients reported
in column (3) provide unbiased estimates for all neighborhood variables as
long as individuals sort themselves over neighborhoods with respect to their
income.
10The estimation results for all variables can be found in Appendix-Table 7.
19Table 2: Individual Unemployment and Neighborhood Unemployment: OLS
Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Age −0.0048∗∗∗ −0.0048∗∗∗ −0.0048∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Age2 (1,000) 0.0835∗∗∗ 0.0840∗∗∗ 0.0843∗∗∗
(0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0168)
Married 0.0384∗∗ 0.0386∗∗ 0.0387∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165)
Foreigner 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.0654∗∗∗ 0.0653∗∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0086)
Female −0.0034 −0.0034 −0.0034
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Medium Education (ISCED 3-4) −0.0336∗∗∗ −0.0340∗∗∗ −0.0340∗∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082)
High Education (ISCED 5-6) −0.1252∗∗∗ −0.1258∗∗∗ −0.1258∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0095)
Year 2003 −0.0067∗∗ −0.0067∗∗ −0.0064∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Local Unemployment Rate 0.0100∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Population (1,000) 0.0008 0.0009
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Share of Highly Educated −0.0001 −0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0005)




Constant 0.0642∗∗ 0.0665∗∗ 0.0658∗∗
(0.0259) (0.0270) (0.0270)
R2 0.0543 0.0544 0.0544
Note: 21,237 observations. Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered on postal area
∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
20Table 3: Individual Unemployment and Neighborhood Unemployment: IV
Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Local Unemployment Rate 0.0158∗∗ 0.0141∗ 0.0162∗∗
(0.0080) (0.0083) (0.0074)
Population (1,000) 0.0076 0.0108 0.0067
(0.0285) (0.0288) (0.0278)
Share of Highly Educated 0.0017 −0.0028 0.0029
(0.0158) (0.0176) (0.0175)
Share of Foreigners 0.0107 0.0129 0.0101
(0.0085) (0.0097) (0.0102)
¯ ωjt −0.1630 0.0418
(0.1042) (0.1802)
R2 0.0516 0.0288 0.0475
First Stage Statistics
Local Unemployment Rate:
Shea-Partial R2 0.0596 0.0598 0.0618
F-Statistic (1st) 18.554 21.396 15.302
Population:
Shea-Partial R2 0.0084 0.0080 0.0084
F-Statistic (1st) 14.919 15.171 12.039
Share of Highly Educated:
Shea-Partial R2 0.0111 0.0092 0.0098
F-Statistic (1st) 13.636 13.120 11.189
Share of Foreigners:
Shea-Partial R2 0.0313 0.0287 0.0290




Note: 21,237 observations. Standard Errors in parentheses. The regression
models further control for the age and age squared and the marital
status of the individuals, a dummy variable for foreigner status,
two dummy variables for the educational degree and a dummy for
the year 2003. See Appendix-Table 7 for full results.
Standard errors are robust and clustered on cells (198 cells)
∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
21For all speciﬁcations, Table 3 shows signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects of the
share of unemployed in the neighborhood on the individual unemployment
probability. The point estimates are larger than the ones obtained when using
OLS regressions, indicating that sorting behavior, if not properly controlled
for, induces a downward bias in the estimates of peer eﬀects of unemploy-
ment. According to the estimated eﬀect in the last column of Table 3, a 1
percentage point increase in the share of unemployed in the neighborhood
increases the the individual unemployment probability by around 1.6%.11
Similar to the OLS model, the estimated eﬀects of the other neighborhood
variables are neither signiﬁcant nor does their inclusion aﬀect the estimated
eﬀect of the local unemployment rate on the individual unemployment prob-
ability. This shows again, that biased estimates due to contextual eﬀects
appears not to be of importance for the question at hand. Note ﬁnally, that
the usual statistics for IV estimates indicate that our estimates do not suﬀer
from a weak instrument problem.
Whether the eﬀect of the local unemployment rate on an individuals’
unemployment probability varies for individuals with a diﬀerent educational
background is investigated by interacting the local unemployment rate with
the dummy variables indicating the highest schooling degree obtained by
an individual. The point estimates from this variation of our speciﬁcation,
which are shown in Table 4, indicate that the eﬀect of the local unemploy-
ment rate on the unemployment probability of an individual is lower for both,
the medium and the high educated if compared to the group of low educated
individuals. However, only the coeﬃcient for the group of highly educated
is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels in the OLS model and turns
insigniﬁcant in the most elaborated IV-model.
Finally, we analyze whether the estimated neighborhood eﬀects diﬀer
when using the share of long-term unemployed instead of the overall unem-
ployment in a postcode area. We expect that the eﬀect of the local long-term
11Test statistics, showing that the results are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.0081 can be
found in the Appendix-Table 15
22Table 4: Neighborhood Eﬀects of Unemployment and Education
OLS IV
Local Unemployment Rate 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0100)
Local Unemployment Rate x Medium Education 0.0010 −0.0007
(0.0017) (0.0093)
Local Unemployment Rate x High Education −0.0055∗∗∗ −0.0105
(0.0018) (0.0091)
¯ ωjt −0.0079 0.0104
(0.0097) (0.1849)
R2 0.0572 0.0151
21,237 observations; Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered on postal area
See Appendix-Tables 8-11 for full results.
∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
See also notes to Table 5.
unemployment rate on the individual unemployment probability should be
larger than the respective eﬀect of the overall local unemployment rate, if the
neighborhood eﬀect is mainly driven by unemployment becoming the social
norm or through a lack of social networks. Table 5 shows that the neighbor-
hood eﬀects of long-term unemployment are indeed substantially larger than
those obtained when using the overall local unemployment rate.
5 Conclusion
Using a unique data set that combines information from an individual sur-
vey with information from administrative social security data and real estate
information from an internet platform, we investigate the eﬀect of neigh-
borhood characteristics, especially unemployment in a postcode area, on the
individual unemployment probability. To address the various identiﬁcation
problems inherent in the analysis of neighborhood eﬀects, we follow an iden-
tiﬁcation strategy that combines an control function approach with an IV-
strategy.
23Table 5: Neighborhood Eﬀects of Long-Term Unemployment on Individual
Unemployment Probability
OLS IV
Local Long-Term Unemployment Rate 0.0423∗∗∗ 0.1995∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0959)
¯ ωjt −0.0190∗ 0.0566
(0.0099) (0.2044)
R2 0.0479 0.026
Note: 21,237 observations. Standard errors statistics in parentheses
The regression models further control for the age and age squared
and the marital status of the individuals, a dummy variable for
foreigner status, two dummy variables for the educational degree
and a dummy for the year 2003, as well as the size of the population,
the share of highly educated and the share of foreigners in the
postcode area. See Appendix-Table 12-14 for full results.
Standard errors are robust and clustered on cells (198 cells)
∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
The empirical result indicate that there is a signiﬁcant and negative causal
eﬀect of local unemployment on an individuals’ employment probability. Ac-
cording to our estimates, an increase in the local unemployment rate by 1
percentage point increases the individual unemployment probability on av-
erage by roughly 1.6%. While these neighborhood eﬀects appear not to vary
with the educational background of the individuals, the neighborhood eﬀects
are substantially higher when using the long-term unemployment rate in-
stead of the overall local unemployment rate in a postcode area.
From a policy perspective the mere existence of neighborhood eﬀects
merit some attention. As we identify endogenous neighborhood eﬀects our
results suggest that regional shocks and policy interventions are able to cre-
ate social multipliers, i.e. spill-over eﬀects on non-treated individuals. One
example for such a regional shock is the closure of big companies which draw
a big part of their workforce from close surroundings, like in old industrial
areas such as the rust belt in the US, the British Midlands or the Ruhr area
24in Germany. According to our estimates these shocks increase unemployment
by more than just the workers who loose their job because of the closing of
a company.
The results, however, also imply that policy interventions can exert social
multiplier eﬀects. This provides some scope for promising innovative inter-
ventions into the labor market. Many labor market authorities throughout
Europe provide ﬁnancial incentives to foster mobility of unemployed to take
up a job in another region of the country. Such incentives, however, are usu-
ally tied to a concrete job oﬀer in the new region. Our results imply that the
unconditional provision of incentives for unemployed to relocate to a region
(or part of the city) with a lower incidence of unemployment might help them
to ﬁnd a job via spill-over-eﬀects from their (then better) environment.
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State: Modernized, well-kept 0.00490
(0.00307)




Type: Farmhouse, Bungalow, Villa, Special 0.197∗∗∗
(0.00327)






















Note: 174,948 observations. Standard errors in parentheses
Reference categories are: State: New and like New, Type: Single-detached
Standard errors are robust and clustered on postal area
∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
32Table 7: Individual Unemployment and Neighborhood Unemployment: IV
Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Age −0.0047∗ −0.0055∗ −0.0045
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0031)
Age2 (1,000) 0.0846∗∗∗ 0.0949∗∗∗ 0.0820∗∗
(0.0328) (0.0359) (0.0375)
Married 0.0303∗ 0.0305∗ 0.0303∗
(0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0169)
Foreigner 0.0154 0.0133 0.0159
(0.0335) (0.0355) (0.0344)
Female −0.0033 −0.0016 −0.0037
(0.0067) (0.0072) (0.0072)
Medium Education (ISCED 3-4) −0.0267 −0.0246 −0.0272
(0.0177) (0.0189) (0.0186)
High Education (ISCED 5-6) −0.1283∗∗∗ −0.1215∗∗∗ −0.1300∗∗∗
(0.0404) (0.0441) (0.0430)
Year 2003 −0.0075 −0.0031 −0.0086
(0.0052) (0.0063) (0.0065)
Local Unemployment Rate 0.0158∗∗ 0.0141∗ 0.0162∗∗
(0.0080) (0.0083) (0.0074)
Population (1,000) 0.0076 0.0108 0.0067
(0.0285) (0.0288) (0.0278)
Share of Highly Educated 0.0017 −0.0028 0.0029
(0.0158) (0.0176) (0.0175)
Share of Foreigners 0.0107 0.0129 0.0101
(0.0085) (0.0097) (0.0102)
¯ ωjt −0.1630 0.0418
(0.1042) (0.1802)
Constant −0.1579 −0.1503 −0.1598
(0.1262) (0.1274) (0.1271)
R2 0.0516 0.0288 0.0475
Note: 21,237 observations. Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered on cells (198 cells)
∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
33Table 8: Neighborhood Eﬀects of Unemployment and Education: OLS Mod-
els
(1) (2) (3)
Age −0.0042∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Age2 (1,000) 0.0761∗∗∗ 0.0766∗∗∗ 0.0769∗∗∗
(0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0171)
Married 0.0329∗∗ 0.0332∗∗ 0.0332∗∗
(0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166)
Foreigner 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0630∗∗∗ 0.0629∗∗∗
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0086)
Female −0.0019 −0.0020 −0.0019
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047)
ISCED 3-4 −0.0475∗∗ −0.0466∗∗ −0.0466∗∗
(0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186)
ISCED 5-6 −0.0527∗∗ −0.0513∗∗ −0.0516∗∗
(0.0209) (0.0208) (0.0208)
Year 2003 −0.0058∗ −0.0058∗ −0.0056∗
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031)
Local Unemployment Rate 0.0106∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Medium x Unemp. Rate 0.0011 0.0010 0.0010
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
High x Unemp. Rate −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0055∗∗∗ −0.0055∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Population (1,000) 0.0007 0.0008
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Share of Highly Educated −0.0002 −0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005)




Constant 0.0487 0.0522 0.0517
(0.0314) (0.0323) (0.0323)
R2 0.0571 0.0572 0.0572
Note: 21,237 observations; Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered on postal area
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
34Table 9: Neighborhood Eﬀects of Unemployment and Education: IV Models
(1) (2) (3)
Age −0.0028 −0.0037 −0.0028
(0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Age2 (1,000) 0.0611 0.0727∗ 0.0603
(0.0379) (0.0416) (0.0425)
Married 0.0223 0.0229 0.0222
(0.0164) (0.0161) (0.0163)
Foreigner 0.0105 0.0092 0.0106
(0.0329) (0.0337) (0.0335)
Female −0.0018 −0.0002 −0.0019
(0.0068) (0.0071) (0.0073)
ISCED 3-4 −0.0262 −0.0317 −0.0259
(0.1042) (0.1034) (0.1032)
ISCED 5-6 −0.0097 −0.0142 −0.0094
(0.0928) (0.0924) (0.0917)
Year 2003 −0.0062 −0.0021 −0.0065
(0.0050) (0.0058) (0.0063)
Local Unemployment Rate 0.0203∗ 0.0180 0.0205∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0100)
Medium x Unemp. Rate −0.0007 −0.0000 −0.0007
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0093)
High x Unemp. Rate −0.0104 −0.0094 −0.0105
(0.0092) (0.0094) (0.0091)
Population (1,000) 0.0006 0.0043 0.0004
(0.0285) (0.0289) (0.0276)
Share of Highly Educated 0.0092 0.0043 0.0095
(0.0184) (0.0201) (0.0199)
Share of Foreigners 0.0126 0.0146 0.0125
(0.0085) (0.0095) (0.0102)
¯ ωjt −0.1583 0.0104
(0.1045) (0.1849)
Constant −0.2564 −0.2375 −0.2577
(0.1967) (0.1971) (0.1958)
R2 0.0169 0.0211 0.0151
Note: 21,237 observations; Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered on cells (198 cells)
∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
35Table 10: First Stage Statistics of IV Models in Table 7
Endogenous Variable
Unemployment Population Education Foreigner ¯ ωjt
Share Size Share Share
IV Model 1
Shea-Partial R2 0.0596 0.0084 0.0111 0.0313
F-Statistic (1st) 18.554 14.919 13.636 23.579
IV Model 2
Shea-Partial R2 0.0598 0.008 0.0092 0.0287
F-Statistic (1st) 21.396 15.171 13.12 23.908
IV Model 3
Shea-Partial R2 0.0618 0.0084 0.0098 0.029 0.0685




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table 12: Neighborhood Eﬀects of Long-Term Unemployment: OLS Models
(1) (2) (3)
Age −0.0045∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Age2 (1,000) 0.0788∗∗∗ 0.0803∗∗∗ 0.0811∗∗∗
(0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0169)
Married 0.0352∗∗ 0.0360∗∗ 0.0361∗∗
(0.0166) (0.0166) (0.0166)
Foreigner 0.0567∗∗∗ 0.0606∗∗∗ 0.0606∗∗∗
(0.0085) (0.0087) (0.0087)
Female −0.0032 −0.0032 −0.0030
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Medium Education (ISCED 3-4) −0.0343∗∗∗ −0.0343∗∗∗ −0.0343∗∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0082)
High Education (ISCED 5-6) −0.1219∗∗∗ −0.1204∗∗∗ −0.1206∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0095)
Year 2003 −0.0613∗∗∗ −0.0599∗∗∗ −0.0589∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0047)
Local LTU Rate 0.0439∗∗∗ 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0423∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Population (1,000) 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Share of Highly Educated −0.0011∗∗ −0.0012∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005)




Constant 0.1153∗∗∗ 0.1308∗∗∗ 0.1285∗∗∗
(0.0253) (0.0262) (0.0262)
R2 0.0470 0.0476 0.0479
Note: 21,237 observations; Standard errors in parentheses
Standard errors are robust and clustered on postal area.
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
38Table 13: Neighborhood Eﬀects of Long-Term Unemployment: IV Models
(1) (2) (3)
Age −0.0049 −0.0057∗ −0.0046
(0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0032)
Age2 (1,000) 0.0863∗∗ 0.0974∗∗ 0.0823∗∗
(0.0359) (0.0396) (0.0390)
Married 0.0438∗∗ 0.0447∗∗ 0.0434∗∗
(0.0218) (0.0214) (0.0219)
Foreigner 0.0396 0.0394 0.0397
(0.0418) (0.0430) (0.0416)
Female −0.0016 0.0000 −0.0022
(0.0081) (0.0087) (0.0085)
Medium Education (ISCED 3-4) −0.0262 −0.0240 −0.0270
(0.0199) (0.0213) (0.0207)
High Education (ISCED 5-6) −0.1371∗∗∗ −0.1312∗∗∗ −0.1393∗∗∗
(0.0471) (0.0508) (0.0491)
Year 2003 −0.2673∗∗ −0.2560∗ −0.2715∗∗
(0.1319) (0.1329) (0.1291)
Local LTU Rate 0.1973∗∗ 0.1914∗ 0.1995∗∗
(0.0975) (0.0981) (0.0959)
Population (1,000) −0.0140 −0.0107 −0.0152
(0.0374) (0.0378) (0.0363)
Share of Highly Educated −0.0112 −0.0159 −0.0095
(0.0193) (0.0213) (0.0211)
Share of Foreigners 0.0182 0.0203 0.0174
(0.0117) (0.0127) (0.0134)
¯ ωjt −0.1554 0.0566
(0.1141) (0.2044)
Constant −0.0581 −0.0589 −0.0578
(0.1385) (0.1401) (0.1380)
R2 0.025 0.026 0.026
Note: 21,237 observations; Standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors are robust and clustered on cells (198 cells)
∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
39Table 14: First Stage Statistics for IV Models in Table 13
Endogenous Variable
LTU Rate Population Education Foreigner ¯ ωjt
Share Share
IV Model 1
Shea-Partial R2 0.0097 0.0059 0.0086 0.019
F-1st Stage 11.274 15.316 13.798 23.521
IV Model 2
Shea-Partial R2 0.0099 0.0057 0.0073 0.0194
F-1st Stage 12.711 15.169 13.307 24.266
IV Model 3
Shea-Partial R2 0.0098 0.0059 0.0078 0.0198 0.0713
F-1st Stage 10.418 12.265 11.392 26.64 165.206
Table 15: Signiﬁcance Tests
Model Test Statistic p-Value
OLS 1 F(1,3031) = 12.722 0.9998
OLS 2 F(1,3031) = 8.894 0.9986
OLS 3 F(1,3031) = 8.19 0.9979
IV 1 F(1,193) = 3.503 0.9686
IV 2 F(1,193) = 2.591 0.9454
IV 3 F(1,193) = 4.316 0.9805
Note: Results from one-sided t-test with H0 : θ>0.0081
Coeﬃcients from Tables 2 and 3.
40